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the traditional and dogmatic standpoint. However he comments on DharmakIrti’s its definition because 
he finds no vital reason to deny its existence.  
He analyses its definition in the way no other scholar has ever treated. He says its definition can 
be considered in three ways as follows: 
(1) uniqueness of its cause 
(2) uniqueness of its object 
(3) uniqueness of itself (=mental perception) 
Using this analysis, he judges the cause of mental perception as continuous one 
(saman?ntara-pratyaya) and its object as cooperating factor with sense perception. Taking his own 
standpoint about mental perception, he refutes the interpretation made by an another commentator 
Vin?tadeva. 
 
 
The Two Meanings of the Word pram??a and Their Relationship 
MIYO Mai 
 
The word pram??a, which is widely used as a key term of epistemology in Indian philosophy, 
seems to have two meanings in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Namely, it means valid 
cognition (samyagjñ?na) in the context of explaining that pram??a falls into two categories, perception 
(pratyak?a) and inference (anum?na). In the context of explaining what is called the theory of 
non-distinction between pram?na and its result (pram??aphala), pram??a is the fact that cognition has 
the image of the object (meyar?pt?), or the form of the grasper (gr?hak?k?ra), which means that it is 
the direct factor for determining which object cognition perceives. 
In this article, I begin by focusing on how we can understand the two meanings of the word 
pram??a in a consistent manner, and I find that according to Dign?ga it is used metaphorically 
(upac?r?t) in the sense of valid cognition. That is to say, when pram??a as valid cognition, 
corresponding to perception and inference, is analyzed through the opposing concepts of means of 
cognition (pram??a) and result of cognition (pram??aphala), it ought to be equated with the result of 
cognition. In this case, the word pram??a is used in the sense of the result of cognition, that is, the 
result of pram??a. 
Secondly, I attempt to compare this usage of the word pram??a with that in the Ny?ya school. In 
the case of the Ny?ya school, the Ny?yas?tra defined some pram??as as cognition, and at the stage of 
the Ny?yabh??ya and Ny?yav?rttika there coexisted two definitions of pram??a, one as valid cognition 
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and the other as means of cognition, but ultimately the means of cognition came to be referred to as 
pram??a and the result of cognition as the result of pram??a. However, the result of pram??a is always 
established separately from pram??a, and so the result of pram??a is consciousness of what is to be 
abandoned and so on (h?n?dibuddhi) when pram??a is cognition of an object. Therefore, it is not 
specific to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school to use the word pram??a in the meaning of 
cognition, but we can acknowledge its distinctiveness in that, while regarding pram??a as cognition, 
they avoided establishing the result of pram??a separately from cognition through the metaphorical 
usage of the word pram??a. 
 
 
Dharmak?rti’s Interpretation of nigrahasth?na (1):  
On as?dhan??gavacana 
SASAKI Ryo 
 
It is well known that Dharmak?rti (ca. 600-660) explains "the condition of defeat" (nigraha-
sth?na), which is the traditional concept of debate, in detail in the V?dany?ya. However, it had not been 
sufficiently clarified by preceding studies that the definition of "the condition of defeat" in the 
V?dany?ya is original and differs from that of the Ny?ya school. Dharmak?rti divides "the condition of 
defeat" between the as?dhan??gavacana, which is the "the condition of defeat" for a disputant, and the 
ado?odbh?vana, which is the "the condition of defeat" for an opponent. The purpose of this study was 
to analyze the as?dhan??gavacana. 
On analysis, it becomes clear that Dharmak?rti interprets as?dhan??gavacana as having five 
meanings according to the following criteria: (i) a case reraltion between s?dhana and a?ga, (ii) the 
meaning of the word s?dhana, (iii) the meaning of the word a?ga, and (iv) the method of adding the 
prefix a-. To be specific, the findings are as follows. In the case of (i), in the first, second, third and 
fourth intepretations s?dhan??ga is interpreted as a case-determined compound (tatpuru?a) and in the 
fifth interpretation it is interpreted as a possessive compound (bahuvr?hi). (ii) In the first, fourth and 
fifth interpretations s?dhana is interpreted as siddhi and in the second and third interpretations s?dhana 
is interpreted as kara?as?dhana. (iii) In the first and fourth interpretations a?ga is interpreted as k?ra?a 
and in the second and third interpretations a?ga is interpreted as avayava and in the fifth interpretation 
a?ga is interpreted as dharma. (iv) In the first and second interpretations the prefix a- is added to 
vacana and in the third, fourth and fifth interpretations the prefix a- is added to s?dhan??ga. 
On the basis of these four sets of criteria, Dharmak?rti interprets as?dhan??gavacana as the 
